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s many biotechnologists, particularly those involved in agriculture, are
beginning to discover, it is not easy to communicate to the public the 
concepts of risk, at least not risk as understood by the scientific community. 
Many people find themselves baffled and chagrined by a weather forecast that 
says there is a 30 percent chance of rain when all they want to know is whether 
to take an umbrella to work.
Those who toil in the mass media are quite conscious of the difficulties 
of communicating risk concepts to the lay public. Hardly a week goes by 
when editors and reporters are not forced to decide whether to publicize 
some alleged threat to the public health. The threat may range from the risk 
of too little calcium or too much iron in the diet to the risk of using a cellular 
telephone or driving a pickup truck with the fuel tanks mounted outside the 
truck frame. Inevitably, one interest group will accuse the media of need-
lessly scaring the public while another interest group will charge that the me-
dia are failing to alert the public to a deadly danger.
The criticisms of the media from the scientific community, however, are 
of a different nature, are considerably more reasoned and, consequently, are 
more closely attended than those from special interest groups. One such
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critic is Daniel E. Koshland Jr., the esteemed editor of Science. In an editorial 
in late 1991, Koshland had this to say about the mass media:
There are many examples these days of improper conduct, of 
which the recent coverage of the chemical Alar, used to slow 
the ripening of apples, is a dramatic example. In that case, a 
clearly dubious report about possible carcinogenicity by a 
special interest group was hyped by a news organization without 
the most simple checks on its reliability or documentation.
This caused panic among consumers and losses of millions 
of dollars by apple growers. Confronted with the inadequacy 
of the data, a spokesman for the public interest group recently 
suggested that it was excusable because people are eating more 
apples than ever before. That is like an embezzler justifying 
embezzlement by saying the banking industry continues to 
survive. Worse, the public’s disdain for repeated scares indi-
cates that an individual publication’s (or broadcast group’s) 
willingness to cry‘wolf’ uncritically may be destroying the 
press’s own credibility and its ability to provide legitimacy 
to responsible environmentalists...the press has been too 
willing to publicize Jeremy Rifkin’s cries of alarm, which 
so far have been consistently wrong.
Koshland goes on to argue that the press should adopt a policy of revealing the 
sources of data that are claimed to be “scientific” and should distinguish be-
tween a report in a peer-reviewed scientific journal and the claims made at a 
“dataless press conference” or in “a public relations document.” He urges that 
“press conferences without peer-reviewed data should be greeted with heavy 
skepticism.”
Most scientists, particularly those in biotechnology who have been in 
the glare of Jeremy Rifkin’s pronouncements, probably agree with Koshland’s 
recommendations on how the press should perform. But Koshland begs the 
more basic question of why a reputable organization like CBS Television and 
a highly regarded program like 60 Minutes would deign in the first place to 
scare the wits out of the apple-eating American public by publicizing a re-
port that lacked peer-reviewed scientific data.
To understand why television, newspapers, news magazines and other 
media would publicize such an unsupported allegation of a health danger it 
might be useful to look at a few examples. None, in this case, deal directly 
with agricultural biotechnology but they offer an insight that might be use-
ful to those who might have to deal with the media and the public about is-
sues of safety and risk of genetically altered crops and irradiated foods.
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An interesting piece of history appeared a few years ago in the journal 
Preventive Medicine. Andrew McClary, a science historian at Michigan State 
University, had dug into newspapers and consumer magazines published in 
the early part of this century to see how they dealt with the problem of the 
housefly (McClary, 1982). The germ theory of disease was fairly new at the 
time and early research had discovered pathogens were harbored in the gut of 
the common housefly. It was well known, of course, that houseflies feed by re-
gurgitation and that they are commonly seen flitting from outhouses and gar-
bage cans to kitchens and dining rooms. These observations had led to the 
seemingly logical conclusion that the ordinary housefly could spread disease.
The evidence that the housefly was a vector of human disease was purely 
circumstantial. There had been no documented cases of human illness being 
directly transmitted via the housefly and infectious disease experts of the day 
said it seemed unlikely that the housefly was an important health hazard.
Nevertheless, the mass media fell in whole-heartedly with local campaigns 
to warn the public of the dangers of the housefly. In addition to many articles 
about proper sanitation, many newspapers 
championed “swat the fly” campaigns, McClary 
found. In Washington, D.C., 5,000 children 
brought in an estimated 7 million dead flies 
during a two-week campaign in which the 
Washington Evening Star offered prizes up to 
$25 for the most flies killed. The champion,
13-year-old Layton Burdette, brought in 
343,800 dead flies, having paid a company of 
25 boys to kill and collect flies for him.
It was the consumer magazines of the 
day, however, that went after the housefly 
with a vengeance, McClary found. In 1911, the Independent described the fly 
as “a monstrous being with more eyes than Argus, wings like a monoplane, 
six long, hairy legs and a mouth armed with horrid mandibles, sucking blood 
and dripping poison.”
McClure’s charged, in 1909, that the fly would “slaughter the little babies 
through the summer.” A year later, Ladies Home Journal asked its readers: 
“What will you do? Shall he continue in his death-dealing path or will you rise 
and‘swat’him?” In 1913, Good Housekeeping declared that “women are the 
mothers of babies and the makers of homes, and the fly is an enemy of both.”
These exaggerated assertions undoubtedly caused the public an immea-
surable amount of anxiety and led to the expenditure of an enormous amount 
of time and money to eliminate the housefly—an effort that continues to this 
day. But the media went unchallenged. Rarely, if ever, did infectious disease
Inevitably, one interest group 
will accuse the media of 
needlessly scaring the public 
while another interest group 
will charge that the media are 
failing to alert the public to a 
deadly danger.
Bishop 109
experts and public health officials step forward and accuse the media of scar-
ing the public on the basis of inadequate scientific evidence. Unlike the Alar 
controversy, the mass media’s “play” of the housefly menace did not damage 
any particular interest. The housefly had no defenders; there was no insect 
rights group trying to protect the innocent housefly. Fly control even 
spawned a not-so-small industry in window screens, fly paper, fly swatters 
and, years later, insecticides.
So it would seem that one aspect of communicating risk to the public 
is whether the communication is likely to affect some particular economic 
interest. Koshland’s editorial condemns “a clearly dubious report...by a spe-
cial interest group”—presumably the Natural Resources Defense Council— 
because it “caused panic among consumers and losses of millions of dollars 
by apple growers” but he fails to classify the apple growers as a special inter-
est group. One can only wonder whether the Alar story would have stirred 
such condemnation if it had not caused a precipitous—but temporary— 
decline in consumption of apples and apple juice.
Be that as it may, McClary raises a question regarding the housefly ar-
ticles that remains pertinent to this day:
Should one condemn these articles as failing to meet desired 
standards of popular science writing? Was it better to gain 
reader interest through mild sensationalism, or risk its loss 
through the use of unemotional, objective prose?
This is not a trivial question that applies only to the media in the early part of 
this century. It is particularly pertinent today when a potential news story 
deals with “risk.”
Every reporter and editor knows that if a story fails to interest the reader, 
the reader simply turns the page and looks for some other story that does in-
terest him or her. No reporter is going to waste his or her time and effort 
writing a story that no one will read. And any newspaper or magazine or 
television news program that consistently publishes articles that fail to inter-
est readers will quickly discover its readers going elsewhere for information.
At the same time, readers do not like to be misled; they resent it when 
they invest their time in reading a story that turns out to be far less interest-
ing and informative than promised by the headline and “lead” of the story. 
One can imagine the chagrin of readers who, a few years ago, spent a dollar on 
a supermarket tabloid with a headline “Man Shot Eight Times and Lives” only 
to discover the story is about a body found with nine bullet holes.
In news stories dealing with risk, the reporter and then the editor have to 
decide how to arouse a reader interest enough to make them pause and read 
the story and yet not mislead the reader. I was reminded recently how diffi-
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cult it is to tread this line by an incident involving one of my own stories 
(Bishop, 1993), an incident which, I fervently hope, continues to be rare on 
The Wall Street Journal.
A medical journal had published an article describing a long-term fol-
low-up of women who had had chest irradiation after surgery for breast can-
cer. The analysis indicated that 10 years after irradiation there was a two-
fold increase in risk of lung cancer. Any story about breast cancer inherently 
stirs reader interest. Many readers have either had breast cancer or have fam-
ily members or friends who have had breast cancer.
And this story would carry particularly strong reader 
interest because in recent years many women diag-
nosed in the early stages of breast cancer have opted 
for a so-called “lumpectomy”—plus radiation— 
in hopes of preserving the breast.
But the report lacked certain information. It de-
scribed only relative risk. The absolute risk of a woman 
developing lung cancer after breast irradiation was 
not calculated. Moreover, the effect of cigarette smok-
ing on the relative risk of lung cancer was not taken into account. A call 
to the authors revealed that their main interest was not in the safety or long-
term effects of breast cancer therapy, but rather in gathering evidence on 
the induction of cancer by ionizing radiation. The lead author had had several 
calls from the press and was becoming a bit overwrought that news stories 
might unduly influence therapeutic decisions for women with breast cancer.
We assumed that many of our readers would hear of this study on the 
evening news or read it in their morning paper. We also felt that if the story 
were not presented in the proper context, women readers who have had or 
might have breast cancer would be unduly alarmed about the findings. There-
fore, it was decided that we would present the new findings to our readers in a 
context that was informative but not alarming. To this end the first sentence 
of the story, the “lead,” read:
A Columbia University scientist cautioned that his finding that 
radiation treatments for breast cancer increase the risk of lung 
cancer were mainly of scientific interest.
“I don’t think women who are being treated for breast cancer 
or who had radiation treatments for breast cancer in the past 
should be overly concerned” about the new finding, said Alfred 
I. Neugut, a cancer specialist at the College of Physicians and 
Surgeons, Columbia University’s medical school in New York.
Later in the evening, an editor on the copy desk decided that the lead sounded 
as though the finding of higher lung cancer risk was old news; it read as
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though the reader already knew about the finding. He changed the lead as 
follows:
A new study says radiation treatments for breast cancer in-
crease the risk of lung cancer, but the Columbia University 
scientist who headed the research team said the finding was 
mainly of scientific interest and should not alarm women 
who receive the treatment.
This version subtly puts more emphasis on the increased risk of lung cancer. 
The change, however, is not too far from the original and still cautions the 
reader that the study should not affect decisions on breast cancer therapy. 
However, a headline has to be written that sums up the story in few succinct 
words. And the headline usually is a condensed version of the lead of the 
story. Thus, the next morning the story appeared with this headline:
STUDY LINKS BREAST CANCER TREATMENT TO HIGHER RISK 
OF THE DISEASE IN LUNGS
News of a risk 
attracts more 
interest than news 
of no risk.
The headline, which gives readers a certain “mindset” before they read the 
story, states exactly what we originally tried to avoid. But the episode shows 
how difficult it is sometimes to grab a reader’s interest without resorting to
the melodramatic exaggerations that the anti-house-
fly writers used three-quarters of a century ago.
The editor’s reaction to the original lead also 
underscores another aspect of reporting risk—ori-
ented stories. News of a risk attracts more interest 
than news of no risk. The original lead did not ap-
peal to the editor, in part, because it indicated that 
readers need not concern themselves about the finding. The change put 
more emphasis on the discovery of a previously unknown risk and the result-
ing headline stated it rather baldly.
This bias against “no risk” stories was described in late 1991 in a report 
appearing in the Journal of the American Medical Association, “Bias Against 
Negative Studies in Newspaper Reports of Medical Research” by Koren and 
Klein of the Hospital for Sick Children in Toronto (Koren and Klein, 1991). 
Earlier in the year a single issue had carried two articles on risk of cancer 
among populations exposed to radiation. One study, the “positive” finding, 
showed that atomic energy workers at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory 
had 63 percent higher than normal risk of developing leukemia. The other 
study, the “negative” study, failed to find any increased risk of cancer among 
people living near nuclear power plants.
Koren and Klein found 19 daily newspapers that had carried stories about 
the articles but only 10 of these reported the results of both studies and,
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of those 10, most emphasized the “positive” finding of a leukemia risk among 
Oak Ridge employees and gave minor consideration to the “negative” finding 
of no risk. Nine of the newspapers reported only 
the “positive” finding.
Koren and Klein conclude: “Responsible journalists 
should acknowledge the importance of providing 
balanced information to the public when covering con-
troversial health issues and should give equal atten-
tion to positive and negative studies.”
Koren and Klein’s finding of bias against nega-
tive studies is not surprising. What Koren and Klein
actually uncovered was not so much a bias on the part of the newspapers as 
a bias on the part of newspaper readers. News of health risks must compete 
for reader attention each day against news of other happenings in the world— 
including wars, murders, economic declines, election campaigns, Congres-
sional votes on health care issues, stock market gyrations and the agonies and 
accomplishments of sports teams. It seems obvious that a scientific study that 
reveals a potential threat to one’s health will compete well for the reader’s at-
tention. On the other hand, a report that tells the readers they need not 
worry about getting cancer from living near a nuclear plant will be of little 
interest to people who do not live near a nuclear power plant, which prob-
ably includes most of the readership of the newspapers surveyed by Koren 
and Klein.
It is somewhat naive to assume that people will read whatever the press decides 
to print. The fact is that, unlike a teacher or even a preacher, the audience served 
by most publications is not a captive audience that 
is required to sit there and read every word impressed 
on the page. It is a capricious audience, a fickle au-
dience that picks and chooses what it wants to read.
This is the overriding criterion used by edi-
tors in deciding what news will be printed about 
risk or any other subject.
This criterion applies just as stringently to 
news about new technologies such as the geneti-
cally engineered economic animals and crops 
which the NABC audience deals with. First and 
foremost readers will want to know how the new
technology will affect their lives. Thus, they will have more interest in ge-
netically engineered tomatoes that will appear on their supermarket shelf 
than a strain of corn genetically engineered for drought resistance. Initially, 
they will be most interested—and the press will be most likely to report— 
how the new technology will benefit them, the readers.
First and foremost 
readers will want to 
know how the new 
technology will affect 
their lives... they will 
immediately want to 
know if it is in any 
way harmful or 
dangerous.
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But once the readers learn that they soon will encounter the products of 
a new technology and that its inventors are promising benefits, they will im-
mediately want to know if it is in any way harmful or dangerous.
The press is acutely aware of these desires of readers and will publish the 
information they want as it becomes available. The first stories will describe 
the new technology, its potential benefits and probably include the assurance 
of its developers that it is safe. But the reporters and editors will be on the 
alert for any indications that the new technology might carry known or un-
known risks. The risks, incidentally, could be financial as well as health-re-
lated since the readership includes those who might want to invest in the new 
technology.
This, for instance, is the reason the press gives publicity to pronounce-
ments and actions by critics like Jeremy Rifkin and Ralph Nader, and prints 
stories about chefs of famous restaurants agreeing not to serve genetically 
engineered foods. Readers, including many attending NABC 5, want to know 
what such criticisms are and when they are expressed. It is as important, or 
perhaps more important, for the scientists and venture capitalists involved in 
developing genetically engineered foods to know what Jeremy Rifkin and the 
chefs are doing as it is for the general public.
To use any other criteria for deciding what should be printed or not 
printed in a newspaper or any other medium of mass communications 
would be lethal for the newspaper. To paraphrase one of my editors of sev-
eral years ago, the newspaper editor who decides to print what he thinks 
people should read instead of what they want to read will soon find he has 
no newspaper to be editor of.
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